DENNIS GEORGE ABRAHAM
Pilots at Fawn Rdg Rd, Concord, NC

5148481, Sep 15, 1992

Jul 1, 1991

7/723875

Dennis G. Abraham - Concord NC
Steven G. Aden - Charlotte NC
Todd W. Arnold - Charlotte NC
Steven W. Neckyfarow - Charlotte NC
William S. Rohland - Charlotte NC

International Business Machines Corporation - Armonk NY

H04L 900

380 46

An improved security system is disclosed which uses an IC card to enhance the security functions involving component authentication, user verification, user authorization and access control, protection of message secrecy and integrity, management of cryptographic keys, and auditability. Both the security method and the apparatus for embodying these functions across a total system or network using a common cryptographic architecture are disclosed. Authorization to perform these functions in the various security component device nodes in the network can be distributed to the various nodes at which they will be executed in order to personalize the use of the components.

5048085, Sep 10, 1991

Oct 6, 1989

7/418068

Dennis G. Abraham - Concord NC
Steven G. Aden - Charlotte NC
Todd W. Arnold - Charlotte NC
Steven W. Neckyfarow - Charlotte NC
William S. Rohland - Charlotte NC

International Business Machines Corporation - Armonk NY

H04K 100

380 23

An improved security system is disclosed which uses an IC card to enchance the security functions involving component authentication, user verification, user authorization and access control, protection of message secrecy and integrity, management of cryptographic keys, and auditablity. Both the security method and the apparatus for embodying these functions across a total system or network using a common cryptographic architecture are disclosed. Authorization to perform there functions in the various security component device nodes in the network can be distributed to the various nodes at which they will be executed in order to personalize the use of the components.

6606387, Aug 12, 2003

Mar 19, 1999

09/273416

Dennis G. Abraham - Concord NC

Trusted Security Solutions, Inc. - Matthews NC

H04L 914

380277, 380278, 380 44, 380 47

A system and method are disclosed for securely establishing a cryptographic key between a first cryptographic device, for example a host cryptographic security module, and a second cryptographic device, for example a bank Automated Teller Machine (ATM). A plurality of key components is generated from a pool of random numbers and a unique reference number indexes each of the key components. The key components are encrypted, stored and indexed in the host security module by the corresponding reference numbers. The key components are arbitrarily distributed to field personnel in tamper evident envelopes to be entered into the ATM. Each of the tamper evident envelopes is marked with the reference number corresponding to the key component contained in the envelope. At least two field personnel each enter a different key component into the ATM to form the cryptographic key. Each then communicates the reference number corresponding to the key component and the identification number of the ATM to the host security module.

6684334, Jan 27, 2004

May 27, 1999

09/321190

Dennis G. Abraham - Concord NC

Trusted Security Solutions, Inc. - Matthews NC

H04L 932

713194, 713201, 380277, 380278, 380279, 380280, 235379

An apparatus and method is disclosed for securely establishing a unique cryptographic key in a first cryptographic device, for example an Automated Teller Machine (ATM). In a preferred embodiment, the ATM includes means for entering a key component and an ATM processor board, and the apparatus includes a microprocessor and a persistent, non-volatile memory device electrically disposed between the key component entry means and the ATM processor board. In a preferred embodiment of the method, the microprocessor detects and captures a key component entered by a key custodian. The microprocessor then determines whether a first key component is present in the non-volatile memory device. If not, the key component is stored in the non-volatile memory device as the persistent key component (PKC). If a PKC is present in the non-volatile memory device, the key component is temporarily stored as a second key component. Each byte of the second key component is then combined with the corresponding byte of the PKC to form the unique cryptographic key.

4799061, Jan 17, 1989

Nov 18, 1985

6/799367

Dennis G. Abraham - Concord NC
Glen P. Double - Concord NC
Steven W. Neckyfarow - Matthews NC

International Business Machines Corporation - Armonk NY

G07D 700, H04K 100, H04L 900

34082534

A system for authenticating components in a communications system using cryptographic techniques to determine if each has the proper key without disclosing information which would be useful to an imposter in deriving the key. A random number generated at a first terminal is encrypted under its key for transmission as a first value to a second terminal whose identity is to be authenticated. The second terminal decrypts the transmitted first value using its key deriving a second value (which equals the random number if the keys are identical. ) The second terminal then encrypts its key using the second value as the key, generating a third value which is transmitted back to the first terminal for verification. The first terminal then verifies the third value, either by decrypting it using the random number as the key to obtain its key or by encrypting its key using the random number as key to derive the third number (if the two keys are identical. ) Optionally, roles of the two terminals are then reversed after the second terminal has been identified, allowing the second terminal to authenticate the first terminal.

4918728, Apr 17, 1990

Aug 30, 1989

7/401486

Stephen M. Matyas - Manassas VA
Dennis G. Abraham - Concord NC
Donald B. Johnson - Manassas VA
Ramesh K. Karne - Herndon VA
An V. Le - Arlington VA
Rostislaw Prymak - Dumfries VA
Julian Thomas - Lagrange NY
John D. Wilkins - Somerville VA
Phil C. Yeh - Poughkeepsie NY

International Business Machines Corporation - Armonk NY

H04L 900

380 21

Data cryptography is achieved in an improved manner by associating with the data cryptography key, a control vector which provides the authorization for the uses of the key intended by the originator of the key. Among the uses specified by the control vector are limitations on encryption, decryption, authentication code generation and verification, translation of the user's data. Complex combinations of data manipulation functions are possible using the control vectors, in accordance with the invention. The system administrator can exercise flexibility in changing the implementation of his security policy by selecting appropriate control vectors in accordance with the invention. Complex scenarios such as encrypted mail box, session protection, file protection, ciphertext translation center, peer-to-peer ciphertext translation, message authentication, message authentication with non-repudiation and many others can be easily implemented by a system designer using the control vectors, in accordance with the invention.

5745576, Apr 28, 1998

May 17, 1996

8/650888

Dennis G. Abraham - Concord NC
Richard K. Hite - Manteca CA

Visa International Service Association - Foster City CA

H04L 932

380 25

The present invention provides a method and apparatus for initializing cryptographic terminals in a cryptographic system. The invention provides a base key that is common to all controllers produced by a manufacturer of cryptographic systems. The base key is installed by the manufacturer of cryptographic terminals in each controller prior to shipment of the controllers. The base key is used only for the purposes of initialization of cryptographic terminals, and is not used for normal operations. Each cryptographic terminal that is to be used with any of the controllers containing the common base key is provided with an initial key by the manufacturer of the terminal. Each initial key is derived from the particular terminal's serial number and the common base key. The initial key is used only for initialization purposes and not for system operation. The terminal and controller establish communications in a normal manner using whatever communication protocol is appropriate for them.

4993069, Feb 12, 1991

Nov 29, 1989

7/443418

Stephen M. Matyas - Manassas VA
Dennis G. Abraham - Concord NC
Donald B. Johnson - Manassas VA
An V. Le - Arlington VA
Rostislaw Prymak - Dumfries VA
John D. Wilkins - Somerville VA
Phil C. Yeh - Poughkeepsie NY

International Business Machines Corporation - Armonk NY

H04K 100

380 23

A cryptographic system and method is provided which accepts a key K encrypted under a key formed by exclusive-ORing a key-encrypting key KK with a first control vector C5 and outputs the same key K encrypted under a key formed by exclusive-ORing KK with a second control vector C6. The set (C5, C6) represents a mapping of the type and usage of the key K defined by the control vector C5 to the type and usage defined by the control vector C6. The set of allowable control vector mappings, that is from C5 to C6, are defined in a control vector translation table, which is specified in advance by authorized installation personnel.

4486784, Dec 4, 1984

Dec 27, 1982

6/453021

Dennis G. Abraham - Concord NC
Thomas W. Gallman - Charlotte NC

International Business Machines Corporation - Armonk NY

H04N 140, H04N 713

358261

A system for compressing image data, when input in the form of run length coded sequential lines of image data, encodes variable length segments of the current to-be-coded line two dimensionally in terms of the detected relationship between the constants of five registers. The run length code words of the current line and the immediately previous reference line are accessed sequentially and selectively from respective FIFO buffers under the control of switching logic which also establishes a pattern of connections, unique to the generated code representing the immediately previous current line segment, coupling the outputs of the registers and the buffers to the inputs of the registers through adders to establish the next set of five values in terms of which segment coding takes place. One dimensional coding can be accommodated.

5237616, Aug 17, 1993

Sep 21, 1992

7/947871

Dennis G. Abraham - Concord NC
Steven G. Aden - Cedar Park TX

International Business Machines Corporation - Armonk NY

H04L 900, G06F 1214

380 49

The microprocessor resides along with its protected real address space in a secure module surrounded by tamper resistant circuitry pad. Encryption programs and encryption keys are stored in the protected memory. A second real address space is also connected to the address and data bus of the microprocessor in order to provide program and data space for a user. Gating circuitry prevent the exposure of instructions and data form the privileged memory from appearing outside of the secure module. The gating circuits switch address spaces by recognizing a sequence of predetermined addresses.