DAVID M ROBINSON, MD
Osteopathic Medicine at 9 Ave, Seattle, WA

8375221, Feb 12, 2013

Jul 29, 2011

13/193945

Stefan Thom - Snohomish WA, US
Jeremiah Cox - Redmond WA, US
David Linsley - Seattle WA, US
Magnus Nystrom - Sammamish WA, US
Himanshu Raj - Issaquah WA, US
David Robinson - Seattle WA, US
Stefan Saroiu - Redmond WA, US
Rob Spiger - Seattle WA, US
Alastair Wolman - Seattle WA, US

Microsoft Corporation - Redmond WA

G06F 11/30, G06F 7/04

713189, 726 6

A “Firmware-Based TPM” or “fTPM” ensures that secure code execution is isolated to prevent a wide variety of potential security breaches. Unlike a conventional hardware based Trusted Platform Module (TPM), isolation is achieved without the use of dedicated security processor hardware or silicon. In general, the fTPM is first instantiated in a pre-OS boot environment by reading the fTPM from system firmware or firmware accessible memory or storage and placed into read-only protected memory of the device. Once instantiated, the fTPM enables execution isolation for ensuring secure code execution. More specifically, the fTPM is placed into protected read-only memory to enable the device to use hardware such as the ARM® architecture's TrustZone™ extensions and security primitives (or similar processor architectures), and thus the devices based on such architectures, to provide secure execution isolation within a “firmware-based TPM” without requiring hardware modifications to existing devices.

2012017, Jul 5, 2012

Dec 30, 2010

12/982235

Tolga Acar - Sammamish WA, US
Brian LaMacchia - Bellevue WA, US
Henry Jerez Morales - Seattle WA, US
Lan Duy Nguyen - Bellevue WA, US
David Robinson - Seattle WA, US
Talha Bin Tariq - Bellevue WA, US

MICROSOFT CORPORATION - Redmond WA

G06F 12/14, H04L 9/00, G06F 21/00

713193, 713189

Described herein are techniques for distributed key management (DKM) in cooperation with Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs). The use of TPMs strengthens the storage and processing security surrounding management of distributed keys. DKM-managed secret keys are not persistently stored in clear form. In effect, the TPMs of participating DKM nodes provide security for DKM keys, and a DKM key, once decrypted with a TPM, is available to be used from memory for ordinary cryptographic operations to encrypt and decrypt user data. TPM public keys can be used to determine the set of trusted nodes to which TPM-encrypted secret keys can be distributed.