DR. ALEX O SINELNIKOV, MD
Radiology in Boston, MA

7600129, Oct 6, 2009

Jul 16, 2004

10/893150

Phil Libin - Cambridge MA, US
Silvio Micali - Brookline MA, US
David Engberg - Cambridge MA, US
Alex Sinelnikov - Boston MA, US

CoreStreet, Ltd. - Cmabridge MA

H04L 29/06, H04L 9/32, H04L 9/08, G06F 21/00, G06F 11/30, G06F 17/00, G06F 7/04, G06F 17/30, H04L 9/00

713185, 713158, 713159, 713160, 713166, 713172, 713173, 713178, 713182, 713186, 380278, 380282, 726 1, 726 2, 726 5, 726 9, 726 20

Determining access includes determining if particular credentials/proofs indicate that access is allowed, determining if there is additional data associated with the credentials/proofs, wherein the additional data is separate from the credentials/proofs, and, if the particular credentials/proofs indicate that access is allowed and if there is additional data associated with the particular credentials/proofs, then deciding whether to deny access according to information provided by the additional data. The credentials/proofs may be in one part or in separate parts. There may be a first administration entity that generates the credentials and other administration entities that generate proofs. The first administration entity may also generate proofs or may not generate proofs. The credentials may correspond to a digital certificate that includes a final value that is a result of applying a one way function to a first one of the proofs.

8015597, Sep 6, 2011

Jul 16, 2004

10/893165

Phil Libin - Cambridge MA, US
Silvio Micali - Brookline MA, US
David Engberg - Cambridge MA, US
Alex Sinelnikov - Boston MA, US

CoreStreet, Ltd. - Cambridge MA

G06F 7/04, H04L 29/06, H04L 9/32, G06F 21/00

726 5, 726 2, 726 4, 726 6, 726 9, 726 18, 726 19, 726 20, 726 21, 726 27, 726 28, 713156, 713158, 713161, 713166, 713170, 713171, 713172, 713173, 713175, 713176, 713180, 713181, 713182, 713185, 713186, 713193, 713194, 380277, 380278, 380282

Issuing and disseminating a data about a credential includes having an entity issue authenticated data indicating that the credential has been revoked, causing the authenticated data to be stored in a first card of a first user, utilizing the first card for transferring the authenticated data to a first door, having the first door store information about the authenticated data, and having the first door rely on information about the authenticated data to deny access to the credential. The authenticated data may be authenticated by a digital signature and the first door may verify the digital signature. The digital signature may be a public-key digital signature. The public key for the digital signature may be associated with the credential. The digital signature may be a private-key digital signature. The credential and the first card may both belong to the first user.

2004004, Mar 11, 2004

Apr 8, 2003

10/409638

Silvio Micali - Brookline MA, US
David Engberg - Cambridge MA, US
Phil Libin - Cambridge MA, US
Leo Reyzin - Cambridge MA, US
Alex Sinelnikov - Boston MA, US

H04L009/00

713/158000

A system and method are disclosed for controlling physical access through a digital certificate validation process that works with standard certificate formats and that enables a certifying authority (CA) to prove the validity status of each certificate C at any time interval (e.g., every day, hour, or minute) starting with C's issue date, D. C's time granularity may be specified within the certificate itself, unless it is the same for all certificates. For example, all certificates may have a one-day granularity with each certificate expires 365 days after issuance. Given certain initial inputs provided by the CA, a one-way hash function is utilized to compute values of a specified byte size that are included on the digital certificate and to compute other values that are kept secret and used in the validation process.

2012027, Nov 1, 2012

Feb 17, 2012

13/399480

Silvio Micali - Brookline MA, US
David Engberg - Cambridge MA, US
Phil Libin - Cambridge MA, US
Leo Reyzin - Cambridge MA, US
Alex Sinelnikov - Boston MA, US

G05B 19/00

340 565

A system and method are disclosed for controlling physical access through a digital certificate validation process that works with standard certificate formats and that enables a certifying authority (CA) to prove the validity status of each certificate C at any time interval (e.g., every day, hour, or minute) starting with C's issue date, D. C's time granularity may be specified within the certificate itself, unless it is the same for all certificates. For example, all certificates may have a one-day granularity with each certificate expires 365 days after issuance. Given certain initial inputs provided by the CA, a one-way hash function is utilized to compute values of a specified byte size that are included on the digital certificate and to compute other values that are kept secret and used in the validation process.

8171524, May 1, 2012

Feb 8, 2008

12/069227

Silvio Micali - Brookline MA, US
David Engberg - Cambridge MA, US
Phil Libin - Cambridge MA, US
Leo Reyzin - Cambridge MA, US
Alex Sinelnikov - Boston MA, US

Corestreet, Ltd. - Cambridge MA

G06F 7/04

726 2, 713176, 713185

A system and method are disclosed for controlling physical access through a digital certificate validation process that works with standard certificate formats and that enables a certifying authority (CA) to prove the validity status of each certificate C at any time interval (e. g. , every day, hour, or minute) starting with C's issue date, D. C's time granularity may be specified within the certificate itself, unless it is the same for all certificates. For example, all certificates may have a one-day granularity with each certificate expires 365 days after issuance. Given certain initial inputs provided by the CA, a one-way hash function is utilized to compute values of a specified byte size that are included on the digital certificate and to compute other values that are kept secret and used in the validation process.